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EDITORIAL.
Owing to the war, the REVIEW will close the year with this
number. Some of the Board of Editors are in military service,
with national and state organizations. Others are at the training
camps for reserve officers.
Special thanks are due to the West Publishing Company for
permission to complete its advertising contract in this number.
With this closing number the board desires to thank all the adver-
tisers whose patronage has made possible the REvIEW's publica-
tion.
THE MARCH BOOK REVIEWS
The March book reviews were written by Mr. Saul Gordon,
whose name was unfortunately omitted from the last number.
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THE ANNUAL DINNER
The tenth annual dinner of the Fordham University School
of Law, held April 14th, 1917, at the Hotel Savoy, was honored
by the presence of the Hon. John Proctor Clarke, presiding
justice of the Appellate Division of the First Department, and
the Hon. Almet F. Jenks, presiding justice of the Second Depart-
ment. Their presence to make addresses was a gratifying tribute
to the standing of our law school.
The public press of the city devoted more space than at any
previous time in our history to reports of the dinner, mentioning
our distinguished guests of honor and featuring the timely and
inspiring address of the Rev. Father Joseph A. Mulry, S. J., the
honored president of Fordham University. The large alumni
attendance was specially noteworthy.
RECENT DECISIONS.
PRINCIPAL AND SURETY- CONSIDERATION- SUFFICIENCY. -
The defendant Gaines was president of the defendant Lake Austin
Canal Company, and also principal stockholder. Prior to the execu-
tion of the notes in question the Canal Company had incurred an
indebtedness to the plaintiff, and when called upon for payment
the corporation gave its certain promissory notes executed by
Gaines as president, and also signed by him individually. When
the first note matured, he wrote to the plaintiff, asking for an ex-
tension of time in which to make payment, and also stated therein
that he would re-indorse the notes. As a defence Gaines set up
that the notes as to him were without consideration. Plaintiff con-
tended that Gaines' execution of the notes was for the purpose of
an extension of time being granted for the payment of the debt of
the Canal Company. Held, it is not necessary that any considera-
tion pass directly to the surety, but a consideration moving to the
principal alone is sufficient to support a contract of suretyship, and
further, that an extension of time of payment was sufficient to
support the suretyship of the defendant Gaines. (Bonner Oil
Company v. Gaines, 191 S. W. 552; affirming 179 S. W. 686.)
It seems that concurrently with this case in Texas, the Georgia
Court of Appeals in the case of Jordon v. First National Bank
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(91 S. E. 287) and also the Washington court in Farmer's State
Bank v. Grey (162 Pac. 531), reached the same result.
There is an abundance of cases on this point in other States,
but in New York they are few and far between, and there does
not appear to have been any very recent adjudication on the point,
although the law is undoubtedly well settled that to support a con-
tract of suretyship it is not necessary that any consideration pass
directly to the surety, but a consideration moving to the principal
alone is sufficient. The courts all seem to hold that what is a suf-
ficient consideration to support the promise of the principal will
sustain the promise of the surety. (Green v. Shaw, 66 Ill. App.
74; Lackey v. Boruff, 152 Ind. 371; First National Bank v. John-
son, 133 Mich. 700; Bassett v. O'Neil Coal and Coke Co., 140 Ky.
346; Laingor v. Lowenthal, 151 Ill. App. 599.) In California, in
Ray v. Borgfeldt (146 P. 679), the Court said that a loan of money
to the maker of a note is consideration for the agreement of his
sureties, signing as comakers, that the note shall be paid. In New
York (Albany County Bank v. Scott, 4 St. Rep. 768; McNaught v.
McClaughrey, 42 N. Y. 22; Penn. Coal Co. v. Blake, 85 N. Y. 230),
the result reached is in accordance with the general trend of author-
ity. In Erie County Savings Bank v. Coit (104 N. Y. 532), the
New York court citing the aforementioned cases held that when a
contract of guaranty is entered into concurrently with the principal
obligation, a consideration which supports the latter supports the
former. As for the sufficiency of the consideration, an extension
of time of payment is sufficient consideration for the promise of a
third party as surety to pay the debt. (Dow-Hayden Grocery Co.
v. Muncy, 24 Ky. Law Rep. 2255; White Sewing Machine Co. v.
Fowler, 28 Nev. 94; Linton v. Chestnutt-Gibbon Grocery Co., 118
Pa. 385; Way v. Mooers, 160 N. W. 1014; Brown v. Peoples Bank
of Searcy, 192 S. W. 900.)
We may go further and say that any indulgence extended to
the principal is sufficient consideration for a contract of suretyship.
(Broughton v. Jos. Lazarus Co., 78 S. E. 1024; Brandt on Surety-
ship and Guaranty, section 16.) The decision in the principal case
is quite in accord with New York and other States and sub-
stantiates the law on the point.
THf SHERMAN (Anti-Trust) LAw.-Plaintiffs were members
of a firm shipping from New York to South African ports.
Defendants, common carriers between these points, entered into
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a combination for the purpose of creating a monopoly of such
trade, seeking to accomplish this purpose by granting rebates to
shippers, on condition that they patronize, exclusively, the steam-
ers of the combination, and by using so-called "fighting ships" to
underbid and drive out competing vessels. The plaintiffs had
patronized a rival carrier, and the amount of the previous rebates
earned by them under the rebate agreement had been withheld
by defendants. Held, verdict of the jury that defendants had
charged an amount exceeding the reasonable freight measured by
the rebates so withheld was proper. (Thomsen & Co. vs. Cayser,
Irvine & Co., United States Supreme Court, New York Law
Journal, April 3rd, 1917.)
The defendants' contention was that the rule, as laid down in
the Standard Oil and Tobacco cases (221 U. S. 1, 106) and ap-
plicable to this case at bar, was to the effect that the "rule of
reason" must be applied in every case "for the purpose of deter-
mining whether the subject before the Court was within the
Statute" and that therefore by the decision of subsequent cases it
is the effect of the rule that only such contracts and combinations
are within the act as by reason of their intent or the inherent
nature of the contemplated acts, prejudice the public interest by
unduly restricting competition or unduly obstructing the course
of trade.
The provisions of the Sherman Act governing the case at bar
are as follows:
"Sec. 1. Every contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or
commerce, among the several States, or with foreign na-
tions, is hereby declared to be illegal. Every person who
shall make any such contract, or engage in any such com-
bination or congpiracy shall be deemed guilty of a mis-
demeanor. * * * "
"Sec. 2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt
to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other per-
son or persons to monopolize any part of the trade or com-
merce among the several States or with foreign nations,
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. * * *"
These sections have been interpreted in numerous decisions of
the Supreme Court; thus in The Trans-Missouri Freight Case,
166 U. S. 290, the Court construed the act to include
"every contract, combination in the form of trust or other-
wise or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among
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the several States or with foreign nations. So far as the
very terms of the statute go, they apply to any contract of
the nature described."
Again, in the Standard Oil Case, 221 U. S. 1, at page 61, it
was construed as follows:
"Having by the first section forbidden all means of
monopolizing trade, that is, unduly restraining it by means
of every contract, combination, etc., the second section
seeks, if possible, to make the prohibitions of the act all the
more complete and perfect by embracing all attempts to
reach the end prohibited by the first section, that is, re-
straints of trade, by any attempt to monopolize, or monop-
olization thereof, even although the acts by which such
results are attempted to be brought about or are brought
about be not embraced within the general enumeration of
the first section. * * * In other words, that freedom
to contract was the essence of freedom from undue re-
straint on the right to contract."
In the Tobacco case, 221 U. S. 106, the Court approved the
decision in the Standard Oil case, and summarized it (p. 179) as
follows:
"Applying the rule of reason to the construction of the
statute, it was held in the Standard Oil case that as the
words 'restraint of trade' at common law and in the law
of this country at the time of the adoption of the Anti-
Trust Act only embraced acts or contracts or agreements or
combinations which operated to the prejudice of the pub-
lic interests by unduly restricting competition or unduly
obstructing the due course of trade or which, either be-
cause of their inherent nature or effect or because of the
evident purpose of the acts, etc., injuriously restrained
trade, that the words as used in the statute were designed
to have and did have but a like significance."
In Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. vs. U. S. (226 U. S. 20, at page
49) the Court declared the law to be settled, as to the interpreta-
tion of the Sherman Act, in a number of cases, so as to "demon-
strate the comprehensive and thorough character of the law and
its sufficiency to prevent evasions of its policy 'by resort to any
disguise, or subterfuge of form' or the escape of its prohibi-
tions 'by any indirection.' Nor can they be evaded by good
motives. * * * "
As the Court ihdicates in its opinion, the arguments used by
the defendants as showing the legal character of the combination
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formed have a familiar ring. They amount, in effect, to a state-
ment that the combination promoted trade, instead of restraining
it; that it was beneficial instead of detrimental to commerce; that
defendants were free to trade where they would; that the com-
bination plan resulted in regularity of service and steadiness of
rates. These arguments are met and their weakness shown by
the -..ell settled law, as above indicated, that neither good motives
nor. good results constitute an excuse or a justification, in law,
for the existence of a monopoly or a combination operating in
restraint of trade,
CARRIERS-LIMITATION OF LIABILITY-CONVERSION OF GOODS-
AGaREE VALUE.-Defendant received packages from plaintiff for
interstate shipment. Clause in the express receipt stated that in
consideration of the rates charged the company was not to be lia-
ble in any event for more than $50. per hundred pounds, unless a
greater value was declared at the time of shipment. Defendant's
employees stole some of the packages. Held, plaintiff could not
recover more than the agreed value. (D'Utassy v. Barrett, Pres.
Adams Exp. Co., 219 N. Y. 420.)
Aside from contract a common carrier of goods is liable for all
loss not due to the act of God or the public enemy, the inherent
nature or qualities of the goods or the act or fault of the owner or
shipper. (6 Cyc. 376, 377; Price v. Oswego & S. R. R. Co., 50 N.
Y. 213; Dorr v. N. J. Steamship.Nav. Co., 11 id. 485.) A carrier
may contract to limit this extreme liability. (6 Cyc. 386; Elliott on
Railroads, Sec. 1500; Hart v. Penn R. R., 112 U. S. 331; Belger v.
Dinsmore, 51 N. Y. 166; Dorr v. N. J. Steamship Nay. Co., supra.)
Contrary to the great weight of authority including the Federal
Courts, New York Courts have sustained contracts limiting the
liability of a carrier for loss due to its own negligence or that
of its agents and servants. (6 Cyc. 388; Elliott on Railroads, Sec.
1497; Camp v. Hartford S. S. Co., 43 Conn. 333; Mynard v.
S. B. & N. Y. R. Co., 71 N. Y. 180; Nicholas v. N. Y. C. &
H. R. R. R. Co., 89 id. 370; Cragin v. N. Y. C. R. R. Co., 51
id. 61.)
As stated in the principal case, there is a clear distinction
between a contract to limit the liability of a carrier and a contract
for an antecedent valuation of the goods at an amount beyond
which the carrier is not to be liable. (6 Cyc. 401; Elliott on Rail-
roads, Sec. 1510; Ga. Pac. R. Co. v. Heighart, 90 Ala. 36.) Con-
FORDHAM LAW REvIEw
tracts for an antecedent valuation are enforced in the Federal
and New York Courts, though the carrier is guilty of negligence.
(Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Dettlebach, 239 U. S. 588,
593; Zimmer v. N. Y. C. R. R. Co., 137 N. Y. 460; Tewes v.
North German Lloyd S. S. Co., 186 id. 158.) On this point, how-
ever, the decisions of the country are at variance. (Hart z,.
Penn. R. R. Co., supra; 6 Cyc. 399; Ga. Pac. R. Co. v. Heighart,
supra; U. S. Exp. v. Backman, 38 Ohio, 144.)
There is also a distinction between a bona fide agreed valuation
and an arbitrary limitation of liability to a stipulated amount.
The former is generally enforced. (6 Cyc. 400; Elliott on Rail-
roads, Sec. 1510; Rosenfeld v. P. D. & E. Ry., 103 Ind. 121.)
Whereas the latter is not. (Moulton v. St. Paul &c. R. Co., 31
Minn. 85; U. S. Exp. Co. v. Backman, supra.) The New York
Courts do not consider this distinction. (Cases above cited.)
The principal case is decided in accordance with the law in
the Federal Courts as the transaction was interstate. The defend-
ant was guilty of conversion by affirmative acts of its employees,
whereas in previous cases the carrier was guilty of negligence.
However, viewing the contract of agreed value as being distinct
from the contract for limited liability the decision is undoubtedly
correct, and would probably be similarly decided under New York
law which allows the carrier to modify its common law liability
as insurer to an almost unlimited extent.
WILLS-CHARITABLE TRUsTs.-Bequests of more than one-half
of Testator's Property "in trust or otherwise" to a Religious
Association.
Vreeland, a resident of New Jersey, died seized of New York
real property worth $41,300, of real property in New Jersey
worth $52,500 and of personalty in New Jersey worth $47,000.
By will, he gave all the property in trust for the North New
Jersey Baptist Association. He left him surviving a widow.
Sec. 17, Decedent Estate Law provides "no person having a
husband, wife, child, or parent, shall by his last will and testament
devise or bequeath to any benevolent, charitable, literary, scientific
or religious assbciation, in trust or otherwise, more than one-half
part of his or her estate, after the payment of debts and such
devise shall be valid to the extent of one-half and no more.
Held: That the provision in will was within Sec. 17, and there-
fore could not pass more than one-half of his estate. Vreeland v.
Decker, 220 N. Y. 326.
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The conclusion reached in this case is obviously in accord with
the Statute and is in line with other New York cases (Jones v.
Kelly, 170 N. Y. 401; Amherst College v. Ritch, 151 N. Y. 282),
but there is matter in the opinion of great interest and importance.
As this was a foreign will, the question arose as to the effect
the gift of all of Testator's property in violation of the New York
statute would have upon New York real estate. In answer, it
was said: "The value of all the testator's property, no matter
where it is, must be taken into consideration. If the legal pro-
vision for charity outside the State amount to one-half or more
than one-half of the entire estate, the property in New York
State will go to the heirs and cainnot be given to charity. If such
provisions outside of New York are less than one-half, so much
of the New York State property may go to the charity devisees
as will make up 50 per cent. and no more. Applying the rule
to this case, we have following, Estate over debts $140,000-
$70,000 can go to charity. If the North New Jersey Baptist Asso-
ciation has received $70,000 of the Estate in New Jersey, it cannot
have any part of the New York Real Estate, which will go to the
heirs of the testator. If the association has received but $50,000,
it can share in the New York Real Estate to extent of $20,000 and
no more."
This method was adopted in California-Matter of Dwyer,
115 Pac. Rep. 242, 245 (1911), which followed Paschalo Acklin,
27 Texas, 173 (1863). Whereas the same rule is laid down in
all three cases, the Texas case may be distinguished from the
other two on its facts. The Law of Texas provided that a testator,
leaving children, could not dispose of more than one-quarter ot
his property to other than his children. A testator, domiciled
in Tennessee, after having devised to his wife and children more
than three-quarters of his property left his Real Property in
Texas, in trust for an educational association. The children
attempted to procure three-quarters of property within Texas
under the Statute, but the court refused to allow it to them since
it said that the object of the law was to secure children a reason-
able portion of parent's estate and they had received more than
the legitimate portion safeguarded them by Texas, although the
property was situated without the jurisdiction. This conclusion
though not logical still is quite equitable.
Sec. 47, D. E. L. in effect provides that the testamentary
disposition of Real Property in this State is regulated by the
laws of the State without regard to the residence of the Testator
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and the disposition of all other property is regulated by the law
of State of his residence at time of death. The logical inference
from this section is, that no regard should be had for the property
situated without the jurisdiction in the determination of the
validity of a testamentary devise of a non-resident, but that atten-
tion of the court should be confined to that within its own jurisdic-
tion. Where a resident of another State makes a bequest of per-
sonal property upon trusts, valid by the law of his domicile, to be
executed in this State, it will not be declared void by our courts
though it would have been invalid had the testator been domiciled
in New York. (Dammertos v. Osborn, 140 N. Y. 30.) Isn't the
court, in fact, in the case under consideration, declaring the
bequest of the personalty in Jersey invalid by taking the entire
property into account instead of the real estate in New York
only? If a testator, resident in foreign jurisdiction, may bequeath
all his personalty in this State, for any purpose, subject to the
validity of the bequest in his own domicile (140 N. Y. 30, supra),
it is illogical to declare that he may not dispose, in the same
manner, of property situated in his domicile. The decision in
Vreeland v. Decker seems to be extra-territorial.' The court is
subjecting citizens of a foreign jurisdiction to our laws.
Vreeland v. Decker raises a very interesting question. Suppose
the testator bequeathed and devised all his Jersey property to
A, B and C and then devised his New York property in trust for
charity. Let us now apply the rule laid down in the case: Taking
all his property into consideration, the New York realty is less
than one-half, and the devise should be maintained. To so hold,
however, would render Sec. 17 ,D. E. L. (supra) nugatory and
our citizens would be deprived of the very protection the Legislature
intended to afford them.
CORPORATIONS-EFFECT OF NON-PAYMENT OF STATUTORY
PERCENTAGE OF SuBscRIPTION.-Defendant subscribed for stock
in a corporation but failed to pay ten per cent. upon the amount
subscribed as required by the Stock Corporation Law (Cons.
Laws, Ch. 59, Sec. 53). The defendant thereafter acted as a
director of the corporation, accepted dividends for a period of
years, and then sold his stock. The corporation became insolvent
and the trustee in bankruptcy sues to recover the amount of the
unpaid subscriptions. Defendant pleaded noncompliance with
the statute as invalidating the contract and thus barring recovery.
HELD, the defendant is liable. (Jeffery v. Selvyn, 220 N. Y. 77).
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Where a statute requires the payment in cash of a certain
percentage of the amount subscribed, at the time of making the
subscription, there is a division of judicial opinion upon the
question whether this payment is necessary to give binding force
to the contract. (10 Cyc. 395 and cases cited; 1 Cook, Corpora-
tion's, 7 ed., Sec. 172-175). At common law and in the absence of
statutory enactment, a stock subscription on credit was sufficient
to pass title to the stock and to make the subscriber a stockholder
when he had acted and been recognized as such by the corpora-
tion. (Wheeler v. Miller, 90 N. Y. 353). The bare fact of
subscription, however, without any payment as required by statute
has been held to void the subscription. (New York, etc., R. R.
v. Van Horn, 57 N. Y. 473.)' But subscriptions not accompanied
by immediate cash payments and subsequently paid do satisfy
the statutory 'provisions, even though same were paid through
the medium of services rendered to the corporation. (Beach v.
Smith, 30 N. Y. 116). The statute in effect in New York today
(Stock Corporation Law, Sec. 53) neither prohibits nor forbids
any other mode of subscription, and a contract of subscription
good and valid at common law is still valid, notwithstanding this
section. (Buffalo & J. R. R. Co. v. Gifford, 87 N. Y. 294, 300).
-Early New York cases laid down the rule that a failure by
the subscriber to pay a required percentage at the time of sub-
scribing was a good defence to an action on the subscription.
(Jenkins v. Union Turnpike Co., N. Y. 1804, 1 Caines Cas. 86;
Van Schaick v. Mackin, 129 A. D. 335, 337) but there has been
a very strong tendency to change these holdings and not to
follow the statutory provision strictly, when to do so would injure
the interests of third parties. Upon the same principles which
defeat the defence of ultra vires when interposed to an action
against a corporation in cases where, if that defence were to
prevail, it would accomplish a legal wrong (Whitney Arms Co. V.
Barlow, 63 N. Y. 62; First Nat. Bank v. Cornell, 8 A. D. 427),
or which forbid a stockholder of a corporation de facto to raise
the objection that its organization is not strictly de jure (Buffalo
& A. R. R. Co. v. Cary, 26 N. Y. 75) is laid the basis for refusing
to permit the defendant in the instant case to plead the statute
and thus deprive the corporation's creditors of the advantage
which he has unduly obtained. (See also 3 Thompson, Corpo-
rations (2nd ed.), Sec. 2793). When, however, the rights of
creditors are in no way involved the court has properly refused
to allow a recovery by either party against the other when the
